Modern equity markets have both fast traders such as dealers, market makers, and High Frequency Traders and slow traders such as retail clients. We model and show empirically that latency differences allow fast liquidity suppliers to pick off slow liquidity demanders at prices inferior to the NBBO. This trading strategy is highly profitable for the fast traders. We estimate that the fast traders earn more than $281 million per year at the expense of the slow traders. Investigating the decrease in NYSE latency in March 2010, we also show that when markets become faster, execution quality improves for fast liquidity demanders, but decreases for slow liquidity demanders.
Strategic liquidity supply in a market with fast and slow traders
Introduction
High frequency traders (HFTs) use computers to open and then close trading positions within milliseconds. A number of studies examine HFTs and conclude that HFTs benefit markets. According to Brogaard (2010) , HFTs participate in 77% of the dollar volume traded, generating $2.8 billion of gross annual trading profits; since HFTs rarely trade with each other, these revenues come from non-HFTs. In return for incurring these costs, markets benefit because HFTs are frequently at the best quotes and dampen market volatility. Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) conclude that increased low-latency activity by HFTs improves traditional market quality measures such as short-term volatility, spreads, and displayed depth. Hendershott and Riodan ( 2011) examine algorithmic traders, of which HFTs are a subset, and conclude that they consume liquidity when it is cheap, supply liquidity when it is expensive, and help move prices toward the efficient price.
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, our research focuses on the ability of fast liquidity suppliers to use their speed advantage to the detriment of slow liquidity demanders, which we believe unambiguously lowers market quality. We show that HFTs earn about 10% of their gross annual trading profit from this strategic trading. The ability of fast traders to take advantage of slow traders is exacerbated in the U.S. by the regulatory and market environment that we describe below. Although our analysis is based on U.S. equity markets, our results are applicable wherever there is simultaneous trading of an asset in multiple markets and traders have different latencies so that some are faster than others.
In order to better integrate the various exchanges trading equities and to encourage the display of liquidity, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted the Order Protection Rule, Rule 611, in 2005. Simply, the Order Protection Rule protects the best bid and ask at one exchange from trades at inferior prices at another exchange. However, the SEC recognized that in computer-driven markets, quotes within an exchange can update faster than the exchange can disseminate its new prices to other exchanges for the evaluation of a National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) . If the instantaneous quoted price from an exchange is used as the reference price for the assessment of trade through violations of the Order Page 6 of 45 Ask (Bid) and the NBBO Ask (Bid). 6 As the Flicker Max Gap increases, relatively fewer exchanges quote at the NBBO. Moreover, the execution quality of trades at Flicker Compliant Prices is significantly lower than the execution quality of trades at the NBBO.
Our results are also economically significant. Based on our sample of 100 NYSE stocks and 168
trading days, we estimate that strategic LSs, posting liquidity at Flicker Compliant Prices earn an additional $30.3 million compared to posting at the NBBO. Extending this analysis to all securities in the Daily Trade and Quote (DTAQ) data with a price over $5, we estimate a market wide impact of the Flicker Quote Exception of about $281 million per year.
Reg NMS Flicker Quote Exception to Rule 611 Overview

Figure 1 shows the three Flicker Event states (cases 1-3). The upper left panel shows the Flicker
Ask Free state. In this state, the NBBO Ask has declined, while the NBBO Bid has either declined (solid line) or remained unchanged (dotted line). The Flicker Ask is greater than the NBBO Ask while the Flicker Bid is equal to the NBBO Bid. Any trade at a price at or below the Flicker Ask, but above the NBBO Ask, is not a trade through. In a downward trending market, LSs are able to sell at prices greater than the NBBO Ask.
The lower left panel shows the Flicker Bid Free state. In this state, the NBBO Bid has increased, while the NBBO Ask has either increased (solid line) or remained unchanged (dotted line). The Flicker Bid is less than the NBBO Bid while the Flicker Ask is equal to the NBBO Ask. Any trade at a price at or above the Flicker Bid, but below the NBBO Bid, is not a trade through. In an upward trending market, LSs are able to buy at prices less than the NBBO Bid.
The upper right panel shows the Flicker Free state. Here, both the NBBO Ask and the NBBO Bid have narrowed over the previous one second, resulting in the ability of LSs to trade at strictly better Flicker Compliant Prices on both sides of the market. Typically, this state begins as either a Flicker Ask
Free state or a Flicker Bid Free state. 6 When the meaning is clear, we may use shorthand version of these terms such as simply the Flicker Max Gap.
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The lower right panel shows the Flicker NBBO Lock state. Here, the NBBO has remained unchanged (solid line) or one or both of the NBBO Ask and Bid have widened (dotted lines), so that the least aggressive NBBO Ask is the current NBBO Ask and the least aggressive NBBO Bid is the current NBBO Bid.
Model
Description of the Model
The Flicker Quote Exception introduces an interesting strategic choice for LSs in Reg NMS markets. Specifically, if one exchange updates the quoted price by disseminating a new quote with a lower (higher) ask (bid) price than the previous NBBO Ask (Bid), other exchanges have a choice to either
(1) update their quotes to compete at the best price, or (2) delay updating their quotes with the hope that a trade will arrive at the exchange and be executed (under the Flicker Quote Exemption) at a higher (lower) price than the best ask (bid) price in the market. 7 We examine the strategic decision faced by LSs (at non-NBBO exchanges) deciding whether to update quotes to match a new NBBO, leave quotes unchanged to trade at a Flicker Price, or enter new orders at NBBO or Flicker Compliant Prices.
Liquidity demand: Traders submitting marketable orders are liquidity demanders. All slow liquidity demanders (Slow Liquidity Demanders-SLDs) are uninformed and observe a past quote that can be equal to or different from the current quote. Becoming an informed trader is expensive and because they are slow, SLDs are not able to capture all of the value of any information acquired. Our interpretation for SLDs is that they are retail traders who may be informed about long term changes in the value of a stock, but because they attempt to manage their trades from a distance, are uninformed about the short term state of the market over second-to-second time horizons. Fast execution requires close proximity to the exchange, but the informed traders do not necessarily reside in a location central to the market. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) and Anand et al. (2011) find that traders in close geographic proximity to corporate headquarters tend to be more informed. The speed of a trader is not governed by his/her physical location, but by the location and speed of their trading platform and how quickly it can assess the state of the market. .
Having a proportion of fast traders being uninformed captures the fact that large institutional traders, such as mutual funds and pension funds, often trade for purely liquidity needs, seeking the best possible prices for execution.
Both SLDs and FULDs believe that the value of an asset is the mid-point of the observed quote.
 is the proportion of SLDs and (1-) is the proportion of FILDs and FULDs. Let  be the proportion of fast traders that are informed. Then (1-)µ is the proportion of FILDs and (1-)(1 -µ) is the proportion of FULDs in the market.
Liquidity supply: Traders submitting non-marketable limit orders are LSs. LSs submit sufficient depth to satisfy all liquidity demand during the Flicker Event. All LSs are fast, observing quotes in real time. We feel that this is a reasonable assumption since significant liquidity is supplied by HFTs, dealers, and market makers. LSs do not know the true value of an asset, but know the distribution of its value. 
. This is the observed quote whether EX2 updates its quote or not. Since, from the time delayed point of view of the SLDs, both EXs offer the same price, they submit  orders to EX2, and
(1-) orders to EX1, where 01. FILDs submit orders to both markets if ,2
LSs' choice
To simplify the notation of the model, we define several simple relationships. 
The LSs at EX2 will not update their quotes if the expected profits from (1) are greater than or equal to the expected profits from (2). Specifically, if
After some extensive algebraic simplification, the EX2 LSs' choice is governed by
The derivation of equation 4 is shown in Appendix A.
The first term represents the LSs' incremental gain from SLDs trading at a higher price when the EX2 quote is not updated. The next two terms represent LSs' savings in losses vis-à-vis FILDs. The second term represents the savings due to a higher trade price. We now turn to the third term. When * 2,2 a P ≥ V FILD > 1,2 a P so that the value of the asset is greater than the ask price at EX1, but less than or equal to the non-updated price at EX2, by not updating the LSs avoid losses on the orders that would be submitted to EX2, The third term captures the benefit of avoiding these losses. Note that when this case occurs X is negative so that the value of the third term is positive. The RHS of equation 4 represents the gains to Page 12 of 45 EX2, if the price is updated, from FULD traders. These profits are sensitive to (gamma), the proportion of FULD's that will route order flow to EX2, when both exchanges are at the same price.
Model Limitations
Our model simplifies reality in several ways that we know are not realistic. A market may have more than two exchanges, in the U.S. market that is the focus of this study, there are nine. While the arrival rate of trades is governed by transaction time, the Flicker Quote Exception is defined in calendar time, creating a non-linear probability of order execution as a function of the time remaining in a Flicker Event. Also, quoting at Flicker Compliant Prices can be accomplished by either submitting a new limit order or by not cancelling an existing order which was at the NBBO prior to the Flicker Event. It may be useful to discuss several of these real world situations in more detail to shed light on our empirical results and highlight possible paths for future extensions. milliseconds. In this case the life of the Flicker Max Gap at 2 is low so that there are likely to be few SLD order arrivals. Hence, the incentive to quote at the higher Flicker Max Gap is substantially reduced. This choice, based on the time remaining in the Flicker Event at a specific Max Gap is not included in our model.
In our examples in previous sections, we have assume that both EX1 and EX2 are quoting at the same price, say an ask of 20.05, and that EX1 reduces it ask. In this case if EX2 simply does nothing it is quoting at the Flicker Price. Perhaps the propensity to quote at a Flicker Price without taking any action is Page 13 of 45 different from the propensity to quote at a Flicker Price if a new quote is required. Hence, the price path by which a quote is achieved could lead to differences in variables such as Realized Spreads, Effective Spreads, and Depth from one Flicker Event to another. In addition, the LS at EX1 can initiate a Flicker Event and simultaneously submit orders to other exchanges at the new Flicker Price. If trades occur, the LS may collect rents from both FULDs and SLDs. Or the LS at EX1 can initiate a Flicker Event by submitting a better priced order to another exchange. Depth at EX1 would then be at the Flicker Price while depth at the alternate exchange would be at the NBBO, again allowing the possibility of collecting rents from both FULDs and SLDs. The investigation of cross market strategies is beyond the scope of this paper.
Hypothesis Development
Equation (4) Price. This implies that quoted depth at Flicker Compliant Prices will be smaller than quoted Depth at NBBO prices. Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003) show that retail investors have smaller trade sizes compared to institutional investors. Smaller depth is also consistent with the theoretical model of Copeland and Galai (1983) . We expect that SLDs are a relatively small proportion of the market with low liquidity needs. Lower quoted depths meet the liquidity requirements of the SLDs while reducing the depth exposed to FILDs. The unconditional probability of transacting with an informed trader at a Flicker Compliant Price is / ( )     while the unconditional probability of transacting with an informed trader at the NBBO is . Since +  1, there is a higher unconditional probability of transacting with informed traders at Flicker Compliant Prices. Holding price fixed, the rational LSs will reduced quoted depths to compensate for the higher unconditional risk. 9 These considerations lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: On an exchange by exchange basis, NBBO Depth is greater than Flicker Depth.
The left hand side of Equation (4) is dependent on  while the right hand side is dependent on .
This implies a potential clientele effect for different exchanges. If a specific exchange attracts more FULDs than SLDs, then that exchange will be more likely to update its quote and match a new NBBO.
Hasbrouck (1995) and Blume and Goldstein (1997) show that regional exchanges tend to execute more retail orders, possibly through preferenced order flow. We investigate whether some exchanges attempt to attract FULDs and others seek to target SLDs. Hence, we test the null hypothesis that the propensity to quote at the NBBO (and Flicker Compliant Prices) is the same across exchanges against the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The propensity to quote at the NBBO (and Flicker Compliant Prices) differs across exchanges.
The left hand side of Equation (4) (2006) who propose the use of a Preferencing Measure (PM) that is defined as the ratio of realized spreads to effective spreads. We assess the execution quality of trades using PM. 10 The lower the PM the better the execution quality. We test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The execution quality of trades executed at Flicker Compliant Prices is inferior to that of trades executed at NBBO prices.
In addition to these hypotheses, we also assess the impact of a change of market speed on slow and fast traders. On 10 March 2008 the NYSE migrated to a new HP UNIX platform that significantly increased the processing capabilities of the Consolidated Tape System (CTS) Multicast data feed. It is this data feed that streams quotes and trade prices to market participants. 11 Securities Industry Automation Corporation (SIAC) processing capacity reports indicate that system capacity doubled for both trades and quotes after the system migration. 12 Results in the next section indicate that market latencies may have dropped by as much as 700 milliseconds. Our expectation is that increases in market speed positively impact the execution quality of fast traders, but negatively impact the execution quality of slow traders.
Specifically, as market latencies decrease, FILDs and FULDs can apply their speed and computational advantage to better target the lowest cost liquidity posted in the market. However, LSs can use their speed and computational advantage to better extract positive rents from SLDs during Flicker Events.
Data, Methods, and Sample
Data and Sample
Our sample period begins on 2 January 2008 and extends through 29 August 2008, which is 168 trading days. Our data are from the Daily Trade and Quote (DTAQ) dataset, which unlike the Monthly Trade and Quote (MTAQ) dataset used extensively in microstructure studies, is time stamped to the millisecond and also contains the exchange calculated NBBO. Our sample period matches the time period of the DTAQ dataset that we have. Our dataset includes nine trading venues, each identified by its DTAQ code. Hereafter, for simplicity, we will refer to these as exchanges although the Automated Display Facility is not an exchange.
For our primary sample, we select the 100 largest NYSE listed common stocks based on market capitalization on 2 January 2008. We exclude financial stocks (SIC code 6000) from our sample because the SEC banned naked short selling on selected financial stocks in July 2008. Because of this ban, during part of our sample period trading in these stocks was unique so that inclusion of these stocks could make our results less general. Also, we restrict our sample to NYSE listed securities. The NASDAQ market provides quotes for NYSE listed firms, but the NYSE will not quote on NASDAQ firms. Hence, NASDAQ firms have one less exchange offering liquidity, which would complicate our analysis without adding any significant benefit. We focus primarily on large firms because at least one exchange is always at the NBBO Bid and NBBO Ask.
Aligning Trades and Quotes
The DTAQ dataset provides trades and quotes in separate files so that a critical technical requirement of our analysis is to be able to integrate the trades with the prevailing NBBO at the time of the trade execution. We align trades and quotes as follows. First, we note that our analysis is focused on trades that are executed on an exchange rather than trades that are merely reported through an exchange.
Most exchanges maintain a Trade Reporting Facility (TRF) where trades that are executed off the exchange (including dark pool trades, internalized trades, and ECN trades) are reported to the consolidated tape. TRF trades are dropped from our analysis because we do not know the quote that was in force at the non-exchange executing venue and because the latency required to report the trade to the exchange introduces an unknown time shift.
13
Our alignment process makes the following assumption. Given that almost all trades are executed in the computerized matching engine of the exchange without human interaction or input, the most correct adjustment to align the NBBO with trade prices is the time lag that maximizes the number of trades that execute at the NBBO. Specifically, for each stock day in the sample, we test quote lag times from 0 to 900 milliseconds in 25 millisecond increments. The 25 millisecond (0.025 second) time step is selected as a compromise between computational time requirements and trade quote alignment. We then select the quote lag that maximizes the number of trades that execute at the NBBO for each stock day. Thus, for each day, there is an individual lag time for each stock. from a major system upgrade for the NYSE and SIAC. Figure 3 indicates that within system latencies dropped by about 700 milliseconds. Unfortunately, we do not have the data to estimate the change to out of system latencies, which would vary by participant location and capabilities, and represent the change in the speed at which participants receive quote and trade information. SIAC documents indicate that the system upgrade more than doubled the ability to process trades and quotes. 14 We believe that the system upgrade also significantly reduced quote latencies for fast traders-FILDs, FULDs, and LSs-while having little impact on SLDs. We investigate the impact of this event in section 5.5.
Flicker Volumes
If there is no or limited trading at Flicker Compliant Prices, the strategic liquidity supply implications of our model lack practical application. Therefore, in 
Results
Market Liquidity under the Flicker Quote Exemption
We begin our analysis by evaluating the amount of time in a typical trading day that each possible Flicker state is in effect. observe the better prices in the market. 15 Our results show that LSs potentially can gain rents from SLDs over a significant part of the typical trading day.
Exchange Depth and Competitive Focus Analysis
Hypothesis 1 states that on an exchange by exchange basis, NBBO Depth is greater than Flicker
Depth. For each of the nine reporting exchanges, Turning to an investigation of exchanges' competitive focus, in In Table 7 
Spread Analysis of Trades at Flicker Compliant Prices
In Table 8 , we report effective and realized half spreads in cents for use in testing Hypothesis 4.
Effective half spreads are the difference between the execution price and the prevailing NBBO at the time of execution. Realized half spreads are the difference between the execution price and the prevailing NBBO 5 minutes after the trade. The NBBO is aligned with trades for each stock day based on the method outlined in section 4.2. Since effective spreads can be zero, resulting in an infinite value of the PM measure, we eliminate observations with effective spreads less than 0.01 cents. Locked and crossed NBBO market states are included our analysis. We also remove trades that execute against hidden liquidity by requiring that trades execute at the posted quote. For the Flicker Ask (Bid) Free state, effective and realized half spreads are calculated using only trades at the ask (bid). Compliant Prices) and fast liquidity demanders (trading at NBBO prices) and present the results in Table   9 . Using a mean difference test, for trades at the NBBO, we reject the hypothesis of equality in each case indicating that faster markets are beneficial to fast traders. However, for trades at Flicker Compliant Prices, we reject the hypothesis of equality for PM in favor of a positive change, but we cannot reject the hypothesis of equality for the two spread measures. Since a higher PM value indicates reduced execution quality, we conclude that the decrease in market latency harmed slow traders. Overall, our results indicate that increases in market speed are beneficial to fast traders, but have a negative impact on slow traders.
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Regression Analysis
Our univariate analysis indicates that market quality degraded for SLDs, but improved for fast traders, after the reduction in latency on the NYSE. To extend our analysis and control for variables that could possibly affect execution quality for fast and slow traders in the pre and post periods, we estimate the following equation:
where PM represents the preferencing measure. 17 Spd is a dummy variable that equals 0 prior to 10 Table 10 shows our regression results for PM. The key result is that the speed dummy variable is significantly positive for trades at Flicker Compliant Prices, but significantly negative for trades at the NBBO. This result confirms the univariate analysis that the decrease in latency on the NYSE degraded execution quality for SLDs, but improved execution quality for fast traders. These results are robust to both the fixed effects and stock day regression approaches. We believe that as market speed increases, fast traders are better able to target executions at NBBO prices, improving their execution quality.
However, fast liquidity suppliers are also better able to target slow traders during Flicker Events, further reducing the execution quality when market speed increases.
Market Wide Impact of Flicker Events
To reduce computational complexities, above we used a sample of the 100 largest firms. Overall, these results indicate that the Flicker Quote Exception liquidity supply strategy is economically significant, highly profitable for LSs, and very costly for SLDs.
Conclusion
The speed of entry and either execution or cancellation of quotes has increased dramatically.
However, not all traders have kept pace in their ability to deal with this fast paced trading environment. In a market with both slow and fast traders, we investigate how strategic liquidity suppliers (such as dealers, market makers, and High Frequency Traders) can submit limit orders with a high probability of transacting against slow traders (likely dominated by retail, uninformed clients). The SEC's Flicker Quote Exception to the Order Protection Rule allows trades on an exchange to occur at prices inferior to the best contemporaneous prices on other exchanges as long as the trade occurs at a price equal to or better than the Flicker Price. The Flicker Price is the least aggressive NBBO Bid and the least aggressive NBBO Ask over the past one second. Since fast traders see the market prices in real time, they only rout trades to markets with quotes at the NBBO. Slow traders, however, observe quotes at a time delay and may rout trades to markets with quotes at prices inferior to the NBBO (Flicker Compliant Prices),. Prices is significantly lower than for trades at the NBBO.
Based on our sample of 100 NYSE stocks and 168 days of trading, we estimate that liquidity suppliers that strategically quote at Flicker Compliant Prices earn $45.5 million in a typical year. Using an extended sample of all equities contained in the Daily Trade and Quote database with a price over $5, we estimate that the market wide impact of the Flicker Quote Exception is $281 million per year in profits to fast liquidity suppliers at the expense of slow retail traders.
On 10 March 2008 the NYSE migrated to a significantly faster computer platform. As a result of this migration, latencies dropped by as much as 700 milliseconds. We use this event to examine how increases in market speed impact fast and slow traders. Our results indicate that execution quality for fast traders improves significantly as market speed increases. However, execution quality for slow traders decreases. Our analysis indicates that as markets become faster, fast traders are better able to avoid trading at Flicker Prices. However, fast liquidity suppliers are also better able to target slow traders at Flicker Prices, earning rents. We show that while both effective and realized spreads of NBBO trades decrease after the market speed increases, the execution quality of trades at Flicker Prices also decrease.
Given the speed of today's markets, we recommend that the one second Flicker Quote Exception specification be reduced based on a periodic evaluation of market latencies. 
Multiplying out the equation, we have
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
Next we cancel terms on the same side to find:
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
Then cancel terms on both sides of the inequality to produce
(1 )(1 )
Finally, we factor the terms in the center to have the final equation:
(1 )(1 ) We need to match (align) the NBBO Ask and Bid in the Quote File with trade prices in the Trade File. The majority of trading in the post Reg NMS market takes place automatically inside each exchange's matching engine. Hence, we believe that the optimal alignment occurs when the time lag yields the highest percentage of trades executing at the NBBO. For each stock day, we examine time lags from 0 to 900 milliseconds at 25 millisecond increments, in turn, and select the time lag that produces the greatest percentage of trades that execute at the NBBO. We present the mean daily time lag on the left vertical axis and the mean percentage of trades that execute at or inside the NBBO on the right vertical axis. 
Flicker Volume
The total volume associated with Flicker Trades.
NBBO Ask
The market wide best ask.
NBBO Ask Depth
The total depth offered at the NBBO Ask.
NBBO Bid
The market wide best bid.
NBBO Bid Depth
The total depth offered at the NBBO Bid.
NBBO Depth
The sum of the NBBO Ask Depth and the NBBO Bid Depth.
NBBO (Quote)
The NBBO Ask and the NBBO Bid together.
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Preferencing Measure
The ratio of realized spreads to effective spreads defined by He, Odders-White, and Ready (2007) Table 7 Exchange Quoting Behavior
We evaluate quoting behavior at the NBBO and at Flicker Compliant Prices for the overall market during Flicker Events and present the results in Panel A. Flicker Max Ask (Bid) Gap is the distance in cents between the NBBO and the Flicker Ask (Bid). We perform our analysis for each side of the market separately for each Flicker state and then average across states. The first row examines quoting behavior for Flicker Events with a Flicker Max Ask (Bid) Gap of 1 cent. During this Flicker Event, LSs at an exchange can quote at the NBBO, which has a Flicker Gap of 0, or at the Flicker Price, which has a Flicker Gap of 1. On a time weighted basis, 2.26 exchanges quote at the NBBO and 1.73 exchanges quote at the Flicker Price. The second row presents the results for Flicker Events with a Flicker Max Ask (Bid) Gap of 2 cents when exchanges can quote at the NBBO (Flicker Gap = 0), at the Flicker Price (Flicker Gap = 2), or at a Flicker Compliant Price (Flicker Gap = 1). We continue in this fashion for each of the remaining rows. The penultimate column presents the number of exchanges quoting at Flicker Compliant Prices and the last column presents Total Breadth, which is the count of the number of exchanges quoting at the NBBO and at Flicker Compliant Prices. For the columns 2-11, in turn, beginning with the second populated row in each column, we test the null hypothesis of equality of means for row i and row i-1. We do not test the row labeled 10+ because it is a composite of more than one Flicker Max Gap. We replicate the analysis limiting our observations to Flicker Events with a life of at least 50 milliseconds and present the results in Panel B. Numbers in bold are significantly lower than the number in the same column on the previous row at the 1% level. 
